With 39 days to go to the UK’s Brexit referendum, and with an awful lot staked on the result for Ireland and the UK, that definition may be truer than we like to think.
Let’s take two examples – Northern Ireland and Scotland.
In the North, there is little enough real love for the EU on either side of the Orange-Green divide. What, for instance, does a DUP voter, in his or her heart, make of the threat of border controls between the six and the twenty-six counties?
What does a DUP voter, in his or in her heart, make of Sinn Féin support for staying in the EU?
What do Sinn Féin voters make of their party’s very belated enthusiasm for staying in the EU, after fifty years of solid opposition to the EEC/EC EU?
How will the two blocs in Northern Ireland view the Brexit question? There are moderates in the North who instinctively steer a course between agreeing with any thing that is proposed by either the DUP of Sinn Féin. They are now in a quandary.
Look then at Scotland. The SNP is dominant; the Tories are resurgent and Labour is in retreat. The SNP favours Scotland staying in the EU. They are talking of another referendum to secede from the UK if the Brexit vote succeeds on June 23rd.
Will there be SNP voters who in the privacy of the ballot box vote “Leave” in the secret hope of Scotland having another referendum to leave the UK? By the same token, will some Scottish Tories vote “Stay” to head off another referendum to break the Union?
Now you may begin to see that the old definition of a referendum has some truth. The “question you didn’t ask” could be a more significant border between North and South in Ireland, or a more significant border between Scotland and England.
This week we have seen a flurry of arguments in England. From the lofty heights of geopolitics to the mundane trivia of day to day life, it is sometimes difficult to see which type of argument will resound better with the voters.
Cameron, for instance, has spoken about Brexit being a threat to world peace, the “special relationship” between the UK and the US, and Britain’s influence in the world. Heady stuff. Scary stuff. This theme was supported in the broadsheets by US governmental luminaries – past and present.
The Daily Express, by contrast, informed its UK readers this week that the EU is now proposing to outlaw Britain’s traditional electric kettles and electric toasters as part of a new energy conservation drive, but that the EU has postponed the measure for fear of alienating UK voters. God knows what the Commission has in mind for the Aga cooker.
At which level is the “typical voter” moved – the threat to their kettles and toasters or the threat to the UK’s special relationship with the US? How do these issues “play in Peoria” – to borrow an Americanism?
Add to all of that the issue of immigration. Angela Merkel’s invitation to one million migrant refugees to come to Germany was a tad naïve. It has gone pear-shaped in Germany. But her efforts to make all other EU member states open their frontiers to the migrant masses from the Middle East has created a political crisis for all of the EU as well.
The Cameron Deal to avoid Brexit was supposed to give the UK an emergency brake on immigration. But Merkel would only concede the possibility of an emergency brake on migrants’ welfare. Is that enough?
Will UK voters be swayed towards rejecting Brexit by any appeal coming from Merkel, Hollande, Juncker or the Brussels establishment? Or will such appeals become counter-productive?
Do UK voters actually care about claims that Brexit poses an “existential threat” to the EU project? Have EU federalists pushed their project so fast that it threatens the EU itself. In just over five weeks we will find out.
What exactly will work to persuade voters to vote “Stay”?
With the gap between “Stay” and “Leave” steadily narrowing, even among business people, it is doubtful whether scare tactics are working. Old and hoary resentments such as the Common Fisheries Policy are increasingly creeping into the media debate.
We in this State have good reason to be scared of both the known and unknown consequences of a Brexit vote.
The scariest aspect is this. The Brexit referendum outcome will probably be decided by the strength of prejudice in underlying attitudes than the rationality of the political arguments.
We in Ireland know very well from recent experience that the referendum process is one where intensity of feeling rather than opinion poll predictions is the important factor. And we Irish are largely spectators in that process.
Unlike the English voters who are unimpressed by scare tactics, the Irish have reason to be scared.